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OLD HABITS DIE HARD: ALEKSANDR 
NIKITIN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
ALEXANDER SEVERANCE* 
Abstract: With the ratification of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Russian Federation 
agreed to subject itself to international scrutiny through the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Russian Federation's espionage case 
against Aleksandr Nikitin provides an illustrative example of the conflict 
between the Russian Federation's new treaty obligations and its existing 
Code of Criminal Procedure. The Nikitin case illustrates the shift of 
some power from Russia's executive branch to its judicial branch, and a 
move towards the rule of law. This Note concludes that the Code of 
Criminal Procedure must be revised if the Russian Federation is to 
comply with its treaty obligations under the Convention. 
The [c]aurt drew attention to the fact that the KGB must now pay attention 
not only to their own interests, but to the evidence . ... Because the court is 
guided by reasons of law, not reasons of KGB "necessity " . . . althaugh we 
have a new president and althmtgh Putin was head of the FSB ... the ver-
dict will stand. And lawyers throughout the world will be able to see whether 
Russia is a state based on the law, or whether the law is just a smoke screen 
to hide any arbitrariness. 
-Sergei Golets, presiding judge in the Nikitin Case1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 13, 2000, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation rejected a bid by the Procurator General to 
* Alexander Severance is the Senior Production Editor of the Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review. 
I Lori Montgomery, Some See a Scary Side to Putin-the Acting President is Popular Among 
Russians. But Advocates for Human Rights are Concerned., PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 
2000, availabk at http:/ /www.philly.com/newslibrary. 
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reopen the treason case against Aleksandr Konstaninovich Nikitin.2 
The decision, affirming an earlier decision by the Judicial Collegium 
of the Supreme Court, is final and marks the first ever acquittal of a 
Russian charged with treason in Soviet or post-Soviet times. 3 As such, 
the acquittal is evidence of the further erosion of control of the Rus-
sian court system by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the 
Procuracy, and an important stride by the Russian judiciary towards 
the rule of law.4 This decision stands along side earlier decisions that 
have helped strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the judiciary 
in Russia.5 However, the judiciary's hesitancy in challenging the legal 
opinions of the FSB and Procuracy can be inferred by the length of 
the process- the trial lasted almost five years.6 It marks yet another of 
the new Russia's growing pains, where Soviet-era training and western 
ideals come into direct conflict.7 
With the deposit of the ratification documents for the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Convention) with the European Council on May 5, 1998, Russia's 
internal policies became subject to international scrutiny.8 
Ratification notwithstanding, Nikitin, who became Amnesty Interna-
tional's first post-Soviet prisoner of conscience in September, 1996, 
continued to suffer alleged violations of his basic human rights as 
defined by both the Convention and the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation (Constitution) .9 Nikitin currently plans to bring suit 
against the Russian Federation in the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg.IO 
This Note addresses the issue of whether Russian law, as it was 
applied to the Nikitin treason case, violated the presumption of inno-
cence and the right to the determination of guilt or innocence pro-
tected by both the Russian Constitution and the Convention. Part II 
of this Note provides background information about Russian criminal 
2 See Reuters, Russia Acquits Nuckar Dissenter Nikitin, availabk at http://www. russiato-
day.com/news.php3?id=199010 (Sept. 14, 2000). 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RussiAN LEGAL SYSTEM 135 (1996). 
6 See Reuters, supra note 2. 
7 See generally WILLIAM E. BuTLER, RussiAN LAw 242 ( 1999). 
8 Jon Gauslaa, The Nikitin Trial. Analysis of the Indictment, at http:/ /www.bellona.no/ 
imaker?id=10290&sub=1 (Oct. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Gauslaa, Analysis]. 
9 International Secretariat of Amnesty International, Despite the Court's &jection of the 
Seventh Indictment Against Him, Akksandr Nikitin Remai·ns on Trial (Oct. 30, 1998), at 
http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9219&sub=1 [hereinafter Amnesty, Court's &jection]. 
1o Reuters, supra note 2. 
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procedure, the structural arrangements of the judicial system, and the 
history of the Nikitin case. Part III of this Note examines the articles 
relevant to Nikitin's presumption of innocence in the Convention 
that might have been violated by the Russian Federation during his 
trial, and relevant case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights. Further, Part III outlines analogous guarantees provided for by 
Russian legislation, and uses the Nikitin case to illustrate how the ap-
plication of the Code of Criminal Procedure can conflict with the 
Convention's guaranty of the presumption of innocence and the right 
to the determination of guilt or innocence. Part IV of this Note advo-
cates necessary changes in the Russian Criminal Procedure Code to 
bring Russia into compliance with the Convention. Part V of this Note 
makes the following conclusions: (1) the Russian Federation's procu-
ratorial behavior and procedural legislation have placed it in violation 
of the Convention; (2) A new Code of Criminal Procedure is long 
overdue, and the laws governing the Procuracy and judiciary must be 
brought in line with the Russian Constitution; (3) procuratorial mis-
conduct should be discouraged through the imposition of procedural 
consequences; and (4) all legislation must be amended or drafted to 
include the obligations imposed by the ratification of the Convention 
for the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights. 
I. BACKGROUND/HISTORY 
A. Russian Criminal Procedure 
The 1960 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Code), as amended, remains in force today and 
continues to be the central document applicable in criminal proceed-
ings.ll The introduction of the new Constitution in 1993, however, has 
superimposed democratic principles upon the Code, which was 
drafted for a social and legal system that has officially, if not actually, 
ceased to exist.12 Exacerbating the confusion are numerous pieces of 
legislation addressing the role of the courts and the Procuracy, 13 and 
u BUTLER, supra note 7, at 242. 
12 ld. 
1~ See id. The Procuracy is an all-encompassing federal executive body charged with su-
pervising the observance of the Constitution and law, the actions of ministries, criminal 
investigations, etc. See also 0 Prokurature Rossiskoi Federatsii (v redaktsii federal'nogo 
zakona ot 17 noyabrya 1995 goda N. 168 F3) [On the Procuracy of the Russian Federation 
(in the edition of the federal law from 17 Nov. 1995 No. 168-F3)], Sobr. Zakonod, RF, 
1995, No. 47 [Nov. 20, 1995], Art. No.2 (Russ.) [hereinafter Procuracy]. 
---- ------~-----------------
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an active Constitutional Court that views dimly a number of Code 
provisions.14 Finally, ratification of twentieth century international 
treaties has changed Russian criminal procedure, through either leg-
islation or judicial interpretation of Russia's new obligations under 
those treaties.I5 
At its core, Russian criminal procedure is a variant of the inquisi-
torial model of continental Europe, differing materially from the An-
glo-American adversarial model.16 A Russian criminal proceeding is 
"event-oriented," meaning the fact of the occurrence or alleged oc-
currence of a crime is investigated instead of inquiring into the guilt 
of a particular personP The function of the court proceeding is to 
inquire into the events surrounding the criminal offense.18 
Throughout the course of the inquiry, the roles of the Procuracy, 
investigative agencies, and the court differ significantly from the 
American system of justice.I9 All Russian courts, procurators, investi-
gators, or agencies of inquiry are required to initiate a criminal case 
whenever the indicia of a crime are disclosed in accordance with pro-
cedures established by law. 2° All parties actively engage in this fact-
finding inquiry, most notably the judge. 21 
The investigation of serious offenses is entrusted to an investiga-
tor, who is required to conduct a comprehensive, balanced, and ex-
haustive investigation of all of the evidence. 22 Based on the evidence 
he collects, the investigator decides whether or not to prepare an 
conclusion to indict a particular person.23 Unlike the French or Ger-
man systems, the investigator is not subject to judicial control, but to 
that of the Procuracy or other state agencies.24 Instead, the investiga-
tor conducts the preliminary investigation, and then presents a con-
clusion of indictment to the procurator.25 The procurator can then 
either reject the conclusion of the investigator as illegal and un-
14 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 242. 
15 Id. at 243. 
16 Id. at 243; see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 139. 
17 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 244. 
18 SMITH, supra note 5, at 139. 
19 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 243. 
20 Id. at 244. 
21 SMITH, supra note 5, at 139. 
22 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 243. 
23 /d. 
24Jd. 
25 UGOLOVNQ-PROTSESSUAL'N\1 KODEKS RF [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION] arts.125, 133(1) (Russ.) [hereinafterUPKRF]. 
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founded,26 send the case back for supplemental investigation,27 ex-
tend the period of inquiry and pre-trial detention,28 suspend or dis-
miss the case,29 confirm the conclusion of indictment and transfer it 
to the court,30 or draft a new conclusion of indictment and transfer it 
to the court. 31 If the court finds the inquiry, preliminary investigation, 
or the resulting indictment to be insufficient, it must send the case 
back to the procurator for supplemental investigation. 32 This can oc-
cur even during trial, at the request of the procurator, judge, or de-
fense counsel. 33 Russian law imposes time limits for the initial investi-
gation, but numerous extensions are possible, and no penalty is 
specified for failing to comply with these time limits.34 
The Russian Procuracy was abolished by the Bolsheviks in 1917 
and replaced by ''worker tribunals" in an attempt at citizen-controlled 
justice.35 However, the Bolsheviks reestablished a Soviet Procuracy in 
1922, and invested it with the power to supervise the legality of ad-
ministrative officials, agencies, and citizens. 36 The Soviet Procuracy 
was involved in every stage of the criminal process: arrest, search for 
evidence, preliminary investigation, trial, review or appeal of cases, 
the supervision of prisons, prisoner complaints, parole, the release of 
prisoners, supervisions of the police and secret police, supervision of 
juvenile commissions, supervision of the courts, and supervision of 
the legal conduct of all government bodies, enterprises, social organi-
zations, officials, and citizens.37 Throughout the Soviet era, the Procu-
racy worked closely with the KGB, the Soviet predecessor to the FSB, 
in investigating, arresting, and prosecuting dissidents.38 By the time of 
communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev's death in November, 1982, 
Soviet citizens had come to fear greatly the Procuracy as an organiza-
tion of state-sponsored coercion closely linked with the KGB. 39 
26 Id. art. 211 (2). 
27 Id. art. 211 (8). 
28 Id. art. 211 (7). 
29 Id. art. 211(11). 
:!0 UPK RF, supra note 25, art. 217. 
~I Id. 
32 Id. art. 232. 
~ GENNADY M. DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAw AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
RuSSIAN FEDERATION 529 (1999). 
Mfd. at50~1. 
~5 SMITH, supra note 5, at 105. 
S6 /d. 
~7 /d. at 106. 
~ Id. at 108. 
~9 ld. 
---------------------
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The Procuracy was slow to respond to the challenges of President 
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms.40 In January, 1992, the Russian legisla-
ture, the Duma, passed the federal law, "On the Procuracy of the Rus-
sian Federation,"41 in an attempt to balance the reformers' demands 
for greater judicial independence with the established legal culture of 
a centralized, unified, and powerful Procuracy with broad-ranging 
authority to supervise compliance with the laws of the Federation.42 
The new legislation's most important change was the elimination of 
procuratorial supervision of the courts.43 Nonetheless, the Procuracy 
preserved its long-standing power to submit cassation protests, or ap-
peals, against unlawful or unfounded court decisions and retained its 
supervisory authority over the conduct of investigatory bodies.44 The 
Procuracy managed to prevent the inclusion of a section in the 1993 
Constitution that would have delineated its powers.45 The law "On the 
Procuracy" was eventually amended on October 18, 1995, to incorpo-
rate the provisions of the new Constitution.46 
Legislation defining the role of the judiciary in Russian criminal 
proceedings is unclear and in conflict.47 Russian judges, consistent 
with continental European practice, are active in eliciting the facts of 
the case at trial.48 Indeed, the phrase from the Code commonly trans-
lated as "trial" is literally translated as "judicial examination. "49 The 
judge is charged with employing "all measures to assure a complete 
and objective investigation of the facts of the case from all sides. "50 
Judges, similar to the continental practice, may call for evidence and 
question witnesses-generally before either the prosecution or the 
defense. 51 The Russian Constitution, however, speaks of "adversary 
principles and equality of the parties [in all] judicial proceedings. "52 
40 SMITH, supra note 5, at 109. 
41 /d. at 119. 
42 /d. at 121. 
43 /d. at 120. 
44 Id. 
45 SMITH, supra note 5, at 126. 
46 See BuTLER, supra note 7, at 176. 
47 See SMITH, supra note 5, at 129-30. 
48 DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 33, at 511. 
49 Id. 
50 /d.; see alm UPK RF, supra note 25, art. 20. But see id. art. 429 (describing the concept 
of adversarial parties and equality of parties within the context of jury trials). 
51 SMITH, supra note 5, at 140. 
52 DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 33, at 511; see also KONSTITUTSIIA RF [ CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERTATION], art. 123(3) (Russ.) (1993) [hereinafter KONST. 
RF]. 
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The array of possible stages in a criminal proceeding is bewilder-
ing. In fact, the proceeding may pass through several stages before it 
reaches trial: initiation of a criminal case, inquiry, preliminary investi-
gation, and an administrative session with a judge. 53 The trial itself 
consists of a judicial examination, similar to a pre-trial hearing, the 
judicial investigation, and pleadings.54 The court, after hearing final 
statements and suggestions from all parties, retires to pass judgment. 55 
All judgments are subject to appeal. 56 
There are five distinguishable types of appeals: appeals of actions 
of the criminal investigators, cassation appeals, cassation protests, pri-
vate appeals, and private protests. 57 Russian appellate procedures in 
criminal proceedings differ from most Western European procedures 
in that appeals may be filed not only by the convicted person or his 
defense counsel, but also by the victim.58 Further, the procurator must 
protest against any illegality in the trial proceedings, even on behalf of 
the accused. 59 
Cassation appeals and protests must be filed within seven days 
from the date ofjudgment.60 The filing of a cassation appeal suspends 
the execution of the judgment.61 The cassation court, the immediate 
court of appeal, must hear the appeal or protest within ten to twenty 
days, depending on the court.62 The court is not bound by the 
grounds of the appeal, but is obliged to verify both the legality and 
the rationality of the judgment with respect to all persons in the 
case.63 The cassation court may reject the appeal or protest, refer the 
case for new investigation or judicial examination, vacate the judg-
ment and terminate the case, or change the judgment.64 
Following the resolution of any cassation appeals, the judgment 
enters into legal force.65 At this point, review by judicial supervision is 
still possible, but only upon a protest by a procurator, a court chair, or 
5~ BuTLER, supra note 7, at 245, 246, 248, 252. 
54 Id. at 253-55. 
55 Id. at 255. 
56 SeeKoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 50(3). 
57 SMITH, supra note 5, at 146. "Appeals" representing action by the accused, "protests" 
denoting an action by the victim or procurator. Id. 
58 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 269. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
6! BuTLER, supra note 7, at 269. 
64Jd. 
65 Id. 
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their deputy chairs. 66 Even a judgment of acquittal (excluding acquit-
tal by jury verdict) may be reviewed through judicial supervision 
within a year of entering into legal force.67 
Anyone entitled to bring protest may do so on the basis of their 
own analysis of lower court decisions, or by virtue of representations 
by an aggrieved person who has the right to petition for review.68 
Many cases are reviewed on the initiative of higher courts seeking to 
identify judicial error or unequal application of the law. 69 Cases may 
also be reopened on the basis of newly-discovered facts or circum-
stances. 7o The theoretical possibilities of appeal and review are virtu-
ally unlimited under the present Code of Criminal Procedure.71 
B. Facts of the Case 
Although the Nikitin case itself lasted just under five years, the 
story actually started in 1992, when Aleksandr Nikitin retired as a 
Captain of the First Rank from the Russian Navy. 72 He served in the 
Northern Fleet, studied the use and repair of naval nuclear reactors at 
the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg (previously Lenin-
grad) and served in Moscow at the Inspection of Nuclear Safety of 
Nuclear Installations of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federa-
tion.73 On October 10, 1992, shortly before retiring, Nikitin signed a 
document promising not to disclose information pertaining to state 
secrets which he had been entrusted with or had learned in the 
course of his service. 74 
On September 7, 1993, almost a year after Nikitin left the Navy, 
Defense Ministry Decree 071:93 entered into force, although it was 
never officially published. 75 This decree included a "Temporary List 
of Secret Information in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
66 !d. 
67 !d. at 269-70. 
68 BuTLER, supra note 7, at 270. 
69 !d. 
70 !d. 
71 !d. 
72 Nikitin Case Verdict St. Petersburg City Court, 29 December, 1999, Supreme Court 2000 Ju-
ridicial Files, at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=14177&sub=1 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2000) [hereinafter City Court Verdict]. 
73 !d. 
74Jd. 
75 Jon Gauslaa, The Prosecution of Nikitin Lacks Legal Foundation, at http:/ /www.bellona. 
no/imaker?id=9654&sub=1 (Jan. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Gauslaa, The Prosecution of Niki-
tin]. 
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tion. "76 Fourteen days later, the federal law, "On State Secrets" was 
officially published. 77 
On December 12, 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion was adopted by referendum. 78 In order to avoid a legal vacuum, 
the drafters of President Yeltsin's new constitution were forced to in-
clude transitional provisions. 79 Part 2, Article 2 of the Constitution 
provides "[l]aws and other legal enactments which were in force on 
the territory of the Russian Federation prior to the entry into force of 
the present Constitution are applied to the extent to which they do 
not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation. "80 To the 
extent that they did not violate the new Constitution, both the Code 
and the Law on State Secrets remained in effect. 81 
According to the procurator, on August 8, 1995, Nikitin, using his 
expired military identification card, entered the special library of the 
Kuznetsov Naval Academy and allegedly read through books describ-
ing nuclear accidents on nuclear submarines.82 Between September 
19th and 23rd of 1995, he prepared a report titled 'The Northern 
Fleet-Sources of Radioactive Contamination" for Bellona, a Norwe-
gian environmental organization, describing nuclear accidents in the 
Russian atomic submarine fleet. 83 
Mter the FSB was notified of the contents of the report, Investi-
gator Osipenko carried out a warrantless search of Nikitin's apart-
ment on October 5, 1995, and confiscated a blue notebook contain-
ing the notes Nikitin had written in the library.84 Simultaneously, the 
FSB raided Bellona's Murmansk office.85 They also brought Nikitin in 
for questioning and confiscated his passport. 86 
76 To the Colkgium on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Su-
preme Court 2000 Juridical Files, at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=15981&sub=1 
[hereinafter Appeal to the Supreme Court]. 
77 0 Gosudarstvennoi Taine [On State Secrets] art. 5 (Russ.). 
78 KoNST. RF, supra note 52. 
79 See generally id. § 2 (containing the Concluding and Transitional Provisions for the 
shift of power between the collapsed Soviet system and the new Russian government). 
so Id. § 2, art. 2. 
81 See id. 
82 City Court Verdict, supra note 72. 
85 Gauslaa, Analysis, supra note 8, § 1; City Court Verdict, supra note 72. 
84 Jd. 
85 See Jon Gauslaa, Akksandr Nikitin vs. the Russian Federation, Background, §1.1, at 
http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9653&sub=1 (jan. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Gauslaa, 
Background]. 
86 See id. 
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Almost 400 miles away, President Yeltsin signed Edict 1203:95 on 
November 12, 1995, which listed information to be considered "se-
cret. "87 On December 20, 1995, in a landmark case, the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation held that there could only be crimi-
nal liability for the transfer of state secrets if the laws classifying the 
information were officially published. 88 This case reinforced the basic 
premises of Article 15.3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion.89 
Despite the fact that no legislation classifying the information 
had been published at the time Nikitin had gathered it,90 the FSB ar-
rested Nikitin on February 6, 1996.91 The first indictment against 
Nikitin, issued by the FSB that day, charged him with violating Articles 
275, state treason in the form of espionage, and 283(2), disclosure of 
state secrets with serious consequences, of the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation.92 
During his detention, several significant events occurred. Mter 
almost two months in detention, on March 27, 1996, the Constitu-
tional Court of the Russian Federation ruled that Nikitin was entitled 
to exercise his constitutional right to choose his own counsel.93 On 
April4, the FSB issued a second indictment against Nikitin.94 On Sep-
87 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossisskoi Federatsii Ob utverzhdenii perechenya svedenii, otne-
cenyx k gosudarstvennoi taine [Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on the 
Confirmation of the List of Information Attributed to State Secrets], Sobr. Zakonod RF, 
1995, No. 49 [Nov. 4, 1995], Art. No.1 (Russ.) [hereinafter Edict 1203:95]. 
88 Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiskoi Federatsii Postanovlenie ot 25 dekabrya 1995 goda N 
17-P [Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Decree from 25 December, 1995, No. 
17-P], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No.1 Uan. 1,1996], Art. No. 54 (Russ.); City Court Verdict, 
supra note 72. 
89 KoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 15(3) ("Laws are subject to official publication. Un-
published laws are not applied. Any normative legal enactments affecting human and civil 
rights, freedoms and duties cannot be applied unless they have been officially published 
for universal information."). 
90 Supreme Court Verdict, Supreme Court 2000 Juridical Files (May 9, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=16713&sub=1 [hereinafter Supreme Court Verdict]. 
91 Eighth Charge Brought Against Former Russian Naval Officer, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, 
July 15, 1999, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Russia Country files; Suzanne Thompson, 
Official: Only Trial Can Clear Nikitin, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, available at LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, The Moscow Times. 
92 City Court Verdict, supra note 72; see also UGOLOVNYI KoDEKS RF [CRIMINAL CoDE 
OF THE RuSSIAN FEDERATION) (UKRF) art. 275, 283(2) (Russ.). 
93 Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.1; see also Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiskoi Fed-
eratsii Postanovlenie ot 27 marta 1996 goda N 8-P [Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation Decree from 27 March 1996 No. 8-p], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 15, [Apr. 8, 
1996],Art.No.1768 (Russ.). 
94 See Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.3; see also UPK RF, supra note 25, art. 
214(2). 
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tember 1, the Defense Ministry issued yet another secret decree, 
055:96, which was never published.95 It contained the "List of Infor-
mation to be classified in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion," replacing the temporary list that came into force onJanuary 1, 
1994.96 On September 13, 1996, the third indictment against Nikitin 
was issued.97 Nikitin remained in pretrial detention for over ten 
months, and was released on December 14, 1996, on the condition 
that he not travel beyond St. Petersburg.98 Two days prior to his re-
lease, the preliminary investigation had concluded, and Nikitin's case 
was sent to court.99 The defense appealed this decision and the case 
was referred to the Procurator General of the Russian Federation.100 
The year of 1997 was relatively eventful for Nikitin. On January 
27th, the Procurator General prolonged the preliminary investiga-
tion, in part due to the acknowledgement that use of retroactive or 
secret decrees to find criminal liability was unconstitutional,IOI None-
theless, on May 27th, an expert panel found that state secrets had 
been transferred, basing their opinion on the definition of informa-
tion constituting state secrets in Presidential Decree 1203:95 (retroac-
tive), Defense Ministry Decree 071:93 (unpublished), and Defense 
Ministry Decree 055:96 (retroactive and unpublished).l02 On June 
17th, a fourth indictment was issued,l03 and a fifth indictment fol-
lowed on September 9th.104 This indictment was based on a presiden-
tial decree signed on November 30, 1996.1°5 At this point, Nikitin had 
95 Gauslaa, The Prosecution of Nikitin, supra note 75, § 2.1. 
96 Appeal to the Supreme Court, supra note 76. 
97 Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.3. 
98 But see List of declarations for Russia, to Human Rights Situation on 01/10/00, 
Treaty no. 005: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, availabk at http:/ /www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2000) (declaring that, in regards to the length of pretrial detention, Russia 
has maintained a reservation with respect to Article 5, points 3 and 4, until such time as 
Russian legislation can be brought in line with the terms of the treaty). 
99 See Resolution About Prolongation of the Time Limit for the Preliminary Investigation, Prose-
cution (jan. 27, 1997), availabk at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=7902&sub=1 [here-
inafter Prolongation]. 
100 See id. 
101 Seeid. 
102 Gauslaa, The Prosecution ofNikitin, supra note 75, § 2.1. 
los Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.3. 
104 Id. 
105 Charles Digges, Investigators Charge Nikitin with Treason for 5th Time, Moscow TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 1997, availabk at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Moscow Times. 
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become the first person in Russia ever to be charged with the same 
crime five times.I06 
On October 6, 1997, Article 5 of the law "On State Secrets" was 
finally amended, thereby changing the "List of Information that may 
be attributed to a State Secret" into the "List of Information constitut-
ing State Secrets. "1°7 This amendment corrected the most fundamen-
tal error in the relevant substantive legislation by including a pub-
lished list of what information was actually classified within the law 
"On State Secrets," as opposed to the types of information that might 
be classified. lOS 
A sixth indictment was issued on February 24, 1998.109 It is un-
clear how this indictment differed from the first five.11° However, all 
six alleged that Nikitin had violated a secret Defense Ministry decree 
that itself was so secret that Nikitin was not allowed to see its text.111 
On April 24th, the city procurator received an order from the Deputy 
General Procurator of the Russian Federation,m and subsequently 
issued a directive to FSB investigators asking that all accusations based 
on retroactive or secret charges be removed from the charges.113 On 
May 8th, a seventh indictment against Nikitin was issued, where all 
references to the retroactive and secret decrees were removed.114 This 
indictment was finally approved by the Procurator General on June 
29, 1998,115 and the case was referred to the City Court of St. Peters-
burg, under Judge Sergei Golets, on June 30th_l16 
The trial began on October 20, 1998. Nine days later, Judge Go-
lets declared the indictment illegally vague and sent it back to the 
106 Anna Badken, Nikitin Charged with Treason for 6th Time, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 27, 
1998, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Moscow Times. 
1°7 Gauslaa, Analysis, sufrra note 8, § 4.3; see also On State Secrets, sufrra note 77, art. 5. 
108 &e Gauslaa, Background, sufrra note 85, § 1.3 (noting that the Duma had found no 
legal means of enforcing the law On State Secrets and that the Duma had requested that 
President Yeltsin draft and submit the List of State Secrets before November 5, 1995). 
109 Id. 
110 Anna Badken, Nikitin Charged with Treason for 6th Time, Moscow TIMEs, Feb. 27, 
1998, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Moscow Times. 
111 Id. 
112 Unauthorized Bellona Translation into English, of a Letter from Prosecutor of the Nikitin 
Case Aleksandr Guts an, to the Investigators of the FSB, dated April1998, at http:/ /www.bellona. 
no/imaker?sub=1&id=7915 (last visited Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Unauthorized Transla-
tion]; see also Gauslaa, The Prosecution of Nikitin, sufrra note 75, § 2.3 (noting the Office of 
Procurator General Apr. 21, 1998 memo). 
m Unauthorized Translation, sufrra note 112. 
114 Gauslaa, Analysis, sufrra note 8, § 2. 
115 Gauslaa, Background, sufrra note 85, § 1.1. 
116 Amnesty, Court's Rejection, sufrra note 9; see also UPK RF, sufrra note 25, art. 217. 
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Office of the Procurator and the FSB for supplementary investiga-
tion.l17 This was apparently the first time that a charge of treason had 
ever been rejected and sent back for supplementary investigation) IS It 
was a victory for Nikitin, but an incomplete victory at best.ll9 
Left in a legallimbo,12° Nikitin appealed the City Court's decision 
to send the case back for supplementary investigation to the Supreme 
Court on November 5, 1998.121 On February 4, 1999, the Supreme 
Court upheld the City Court's decision declaring the indictment ille-
gally vague, and sent the case back for further investigation.l22 On july 
15, 1999, the Supreme Court allowed a revised, eighth indictment to 
be brought against Nikitin.123 Finally, after ten and a half months of 
trial, on December 29, 1999, the City Court of St. Petersburg acquit-
ted Aleksandr Nikitin.124 Four days later, the Procurator protested the 
acquittal to the Supreme Court.125 The acquittal was not affirmed by 
the Judicial Collegium on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court until 
April17, 2000,126 
The prosecution again appealed, this time to the Presidium of 
the Supreme Court.l27 The Presidium represents Russia's final court 
of appeal, and consists of the Chairman of the Supreme Court, its 
First Deputy Chairman, the six deputy chairmen, and five other Su-
preme Court judges.l2B Only the prosecution has the right to appeal 
to the Presidium, and only 0.4% of Russian criminal cases in 1998 
ended with an acquittal.l29 As a result, very few criminal cases re-
viewed by the three-judge panels of the Supreme Court make it to the 
Presidium.l30 On September 13, 2000, the Presidium made history by 
117 Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.2; Amnesty, Court's Rejection, supra note 9. 
118 Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.2. 
119 See id. § 1.3. 
12° See International Secretariat of Amnesty International, lWw is Aji·aid of Aleksandr 
Nikitin (Feb. 4, 1999), at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9223&sub=1 [hereinafter 
Amnesty, Afraid]. 
121 Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.3. 
122 See Amnesty, Afraid, supra note 120. 
123 Eighth Charge Brought Against Former Russian Naval Officer, supra note 91. 
124 See City Court Verdict, supra note 72, at 34. 
125 Appeal to the Supreme Court, supra note 76, at 1. 
126 See Supreme Court Verdict, supra note 90, at 5. 
127 Appeal by the Prosecutor General, Supreme Court 2000 Juridical Files, at http://www. 
bellona.no/imaker?id=l7382&sub=l (last visited Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Appeal to 
the Presidium]. 
128 For a further explanation of the Presidium's structure, see Jon Gauslaa, The Reputa-
tion of the Presidium, at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=17852&sub=1 (Sept. 11, 2000). 
129 /d. 
130 /d. 
190 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:177 
rejecting the Procurator's bid to reopen the case against Nikitin.131 
Mter nine indictments for the same crime and years of uncertainty, 
Aleksandr Nikitin had become the first Russian to be completely ac-
quitted of a charge of high treason in the Soviet or post-Soviet era.132 
II. VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
A. Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial 
Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial.133 
Section 1 states in part, "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. "134 Returning 
the case to the Procurator effectively takes the case out of the hands 
of the court. Because the judge is obligated to return the case to the 
Procurator when the indictment is insufficient or the investigative 
bodies have violated the rules of criminal procedure, the accused is 
effectively prevented from having the charges against him determined 
in a court of law, thereby violating his rights under the Constitution 
and the Convention.135 By allowing eight different revisions of the 
indictment to be considered, the criminal justice system in place 
prevented an ultimate "determination" of even the nature of the 
criminal charges against Nikitin.136 
Section 2 of Article 6 of the Convention provides, "[e]veryone 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law. "137 In Adolf v. Austria, 138 the court held 
that it may be a violation of Article 6(2) if a criminal case concludes 
m Reuters, supra note 2. 
132 /d.; see also Supreme Court Verdict, supra note 90. 
133 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter Convention]. 
134 See id. art. 6(1). 
135 See id.; KoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 47(2); UPKRF, supra note 25, art. 232(2). 
136 Convention, supra note 133, art. 6(1); see also D. J. HARRIS ET AL., LAw OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 217 (1995) (stating that freedom from double 
jeopardy guaranteed in the Seventh Protocol does not necessarily mean that it is not pro-
tected by Article 6(1) of the Convention). 
m Convention, supra note 133, art. 6(2). 
138 Adolfv. Austria, App. No. 49, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1994), available at http://www. 
echr.coe.int/ eng. 
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without a decision on the question of guilt.l39 In Nikitin's case the 
investigation was closed and re-opened on several occasions.140 In 
addition, it is also debatable whether allowing the indictment to be 
revised eight times for the same action is indicative of a system that 
presumes the innocence of the accused. 
B. Article 7: No Punishment Without Law 
Article 7(1) of the Convention provides, "[n]o one shall be held 
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. "141 This has been expanded on 
in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 142 where the court held that Article 7.1: 
is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application 
of the criminal law to an accused's disadvantage. It also em-
bodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can 
define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, 
nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal 
law must not be extensively construed to an accused's detri-
ment, for instance by analogy; it follows from this that an of-
fence must be clearly defined in law.143 
The present Code of Criminal Procedure does not allow the accused 
to read through the material of his case before the investigative 
authorities have declared the investigation to be completed.l44 
Furthermore, because they themselves were "secret," Nikitin was not 
given access to the decrees that formed the basis of the charges 
against him until October 20, 1998, more than three years after the 
case had begun_l45 
139 /d. at 324. 
140 Jon Gauslaa, Aleksandr Nikitin vs. the Russian Federation, The City Court's Verdict and the 
EC on HR, § 3.2.2, at http:/ /www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9655&sub=1 (jan. 29, 2000) 
[hereinafter Gauslaa, City Court]. 
141 Convention, supra note 133, art. 7(1). 
142 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 423 (1994), avail-
able at http:/ /www.echr.coe.int/ eng. 
143 /d. 
144 Gauslaa, City Court, supra note 140, § 3.2.2; see also UPK RF, supra note 25, art. 201. 
145 Gauslaa, City Court, supra note 140, § 3.2.4. 
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C. Relevant Russian Legislation 
1. Russian Legislation Analogous to Article 6 of the Convention 
Article 4 7 of the Russian Constitution roughly corresponds to 
Article 6(1) of the Convention. Regarding determination, "[a]nyone 
accused of having committed a crime has the right to have the case 
against him heard by a court and jury as provided by federal law. "146 
No one can be deprived of that right.147 However, it should be noted 
that the Russian Constitution fails to indicate the time within which 
the case must be heard. As a result, the "reasonable time" require-
ment of Article 6(1) of the Convention should be controlling. 
Tracking Article 6(2) of the Convention, Article 49 of the Consti-
tution addresses the assumption of innocence. In its entirety, Article 
49 states: 
1) Each person accused of having committed a crime is pre-
sumed innocent until his guilt is proved as provided by fed-
eral law and established by means of a legitimate court sen-
tence. 
2) The accused is not obliged to prove his innocence. 
3) Any undispelled doubts regarding the individual's guilt 
are interpreted in the accused's favor.l48 
2. Russian Legislation Analogous to Article 7 of the Convention 
Article 7 ( 1) of the Convention is mirrored by Article 54 points 1 
and 2 of the Constitution, which guarantee: 
1) No law establishing or mitigating liability can be retroac-
tive. 2) No one can be held liable for any act which, at the 
time it was committed, was not considered to be in breach of 
the law. If liability for a breach of the law is abolished or 
mitigated after an act has been committed, the new law is 
applied.149 
In addition, Article 15(3) of the Constitution guarantees that, "[l]aws 
are subject to official publication. Unpublished laws are not applied. 
Any normative legal enactments affecting human and civil rights, 
146 KoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 47(2). 
147 /d. art. 47(1). 
148
./d. art. 49. 
149Jd. art. 54(1), (2); see also UK RF, supra note 92, art. 10. 
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freedoms and duties cannot be applied unless they have been 
officially published for universal information. "150 Thus, in Russia, the 
application of unpublished or retroactive laws, to the detriment of the 
accused, would be considered a violation of both Article 7 of the Con-
vention and Articles 15 and 54 of the Constitution. 
D. The Nikitin Case as an Illustrative Example of the Potential 
for Procedural Abuse 
1. Prior Knowledge of the Legal Inadequacy of the Secrecy Laws 
As early as March 16, 1995, the chairman of the Security Commit-
tee of the Russian Duma, the federal legislative body, was aware that 
an incredibly absurd situation existed where, technically, nothing was 
secret.l51 The Duma stated that since a List of Data pertaining to State 
Secrets had not been submitted to the President, "the law enforce-
ment organs of the country [were] deprived of legal means to fulfill 
the functions imposed on them. "152 
The FSB was also aware that Nikitin had been charged with ret-
roactive and secret decrees.153 All charges brought before May 8, 1998 
accused Nikitin of having "handed over to a foreign organization in-
formation classified as state secrets according to Article 5 of the Fed-
eral Law on State Secrets, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the List of Informa-
tion related to the State Secrets formalized by Presidential Decree 
dated November 30, 1995 No. 1203, and various paragraphs of the 
secret decrees No. 071:93 and 055:96 from the Ministry of De-
fense."154 In the FSB's answer of February 24, 1998, it was admitted 
that: 
these decrees were introduced after Nikitin's actions. If one 
follows the logic of the defenders, Russian Law has no nor-
mative documents that stipulate the level of secrecy of in-
formation. And there are no such documents that could be 
used in connection with an expert evaluation of the informa-
150 KoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 15(3). 
151 See Gauslaa, Background, supra note 85, § 1.3 (referencing Letter No. 314-569 of 
March 16, 1995, from the chairman of the Security Committee of the Russian State Duma 
to the Russian Government; Letter No. 314-1982, placing the question on the Duma's 
plenary agenda; Resolution No. 1271-1GD, requesting the Government to draft the List of 
Secrets, found in Russian Federation, Law Files Volume 45, Nov. 6, 1995, page 4291). 
152 See id. 
153 Gauslaa, Analysis, supra note 8, § 2. 
154 /d. 
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tion that was collected by Nikitin and handed over to a for-
eign organization. According to this logic, the experts would 
have nothing else to base their conclusion on [other] than 
the Law on State Secrets.155 
After six attempts to have the decrees included in the indictment, the 
FSB struck all direct reference of retroactive and secret decrees from 
the May 8, 1998 charges and the June 29, 1998 legal part of the 
document.156 
On January 27, 1997, the Deputy of the Procurator General of 
the Russian Federation, M. B. Katushev, in signing the "Resolution 
About Prolongation of the Time Limit for the Preliminary Investiga-
tion," stated that, "the case was sent to court too early. There are a se-
ries of important mistakes, the charges presented are not concrete, 
while the juridical norms applied did not comply with the Russian 
Constitution. "157 He went on to write, "[t]he claim presented by the 
defense lawyers that the expert committee illegally used normative 
acts in establishing which information should be considered state se-
crets is herewith sustained. "158 Finally, he declared, "the violation of 
Nikitin's rights in the prior evaluation must be eliminated. "159 None-
theless, in accordance with Articles 133 and 211 of the Code, he ex-
tended the preliminary investigation from twelve to fifteen months.160 
On April27 of 1998, the local procurator, A. V. Gutsan, admitted 
that the first six indictments contained mistakes.161 Specifically, the 
procurator was aware that Nikitin had been "accused of having vio-
lated normative acts which were not published officially for general 
knowledge, and normative acts which were published after the alleged 
transferal of state secrets had taken place. "162 He specifically acknowl-
edged that this violated Article 15 of the Constitution.163 Accordingly, 
he ordered that the mistakes in the FSB's indictment be corrected.164 
Even so, the seventh indictment was so vague that the City Court 
stated, in its verdict of October 29, 1998, that the indictment deprived 
155 /d. 
156 /d. 
157 Prolongation, supra note 99. 
158 Jd. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Unauthorized Translation, supra note 112. 
162 Jd. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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Nikitin of his right "to defend himself with legal means. "165 This could 
be considered a violation of the accused's right to the determination 
of criminal charges against him under the Convention.I66 
According to the Code, without legal means to define the indicia 
of a crime, a proceeding may not be initiated and any initiated pro-
ceedings are subject to dismissa1.167 Charging someone with a crime 
not established by law violates Article 4 of the Code, and Article 7 (1) 
of the Convention.I68 
2. Procedural Maneuvering by the Procuracy 
By intentionally submitting an indictment containing a mistake 
to the court, the Procuracy has legal grounds to protest any undesir-
able decision.169 The procurator is obligated to protest any illegality in 
the proceedings, even his own mistakes.I7o This procedural Trojan 
horse was used against Nikitin by the Procuracy when the Office of 
Procurator General submitted its appeal of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, reasoning in part that, "the need to send the case for further 
investigation to correct its shortcomings and eliminate violations 
[against Nikitin] is obvious."171 Thus, the Procuracy has the ability to 
guarantee an appeal at its discretion. 
With the ability to demand a review of both the findings of fact 
and law of a court's decision, and the right to introduce new evi-
dence, the Procuracy also has the de facto right to try a suspect in 
court more than once.I72 The Procurator can wait for up to a year af-
ter a decision has come down before requesting review by way of judi-
cial supervision.l73 Cases can be reopened on the basis of newly dis-
covered evidence,l74 In essence, the case against the accused can 
remain undetermined indefinitely. This is a violation of Article 6(1) 
of the Convention, which entitles everyone to have the criminal 
charges against him determined within a reasonable time.175 It also 
appears to be a de facto violation of Article 50 ( 1) of the Constitution, 
165 Gauslaa, City Court, sufrra note 140, § 3.1.1. 
166 See Convention, sufrra note 133, art. 6(1). 
167 See UPK RF, sufrra note 25, art. 5(2). 
168 See Convention, sufrra note 133, art. 7(1); UPKRF, sufrra note 25, art. 4. 
169 See id. arts. 341, 342. 
170 See id. 
171 See Appeal to the Presidium, sufrra note 127. 
172 See BuTLER, sufrra note 7, at 269. 
m Seeid. 
174 See id. at 270. 
175 SeeConvention, sufrranote 133, art. 6(1). 
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which provides that "[n]o one can be tried a second time for the same 
crime."176 
CONCLUSION 
Russia must revise its Code of Criminal Procedure. Initially 
drafted in the Krushchev era, it no longer serves the needs of a new 
democracy. Because Russia's previous experiences with "swift" justice 
are predominantly negative, the issue of what constitutes a 
"reasonable time" has not been addressed However, there remains 
fundamental issues of predictability, fairness, and the roles of the 
participants in an adversarial system. 
Allowing the Procuracy time to revise the indictments of the 
investigative bodies seems prudent. However, once the indictment is 
sent to the court, the Procuracy should be bound to pursue it as it 
stands. Inadequate or flawed indictments should be grounds for 
dismissal for the same reason. Requiring the Procuracy to commit to 
the legal documents and factual evidence it intends to present at trial 
would necessarily raise the level of professionalism of procurators. 
The obligation of the Russian courts to return the case to the 
Procuracy for procuratorial mistakes, combined with the Procuracy's 
right to demand review by supervision, discourages procuratorial 
professionalism, encourages procuratorial sloth, and unfortunately 
provides grounds for later procuratorial protest of unfavorable 
decisions. In essence, there are no negative consequences for drafting 
intentionally vague or flawed indictments; the worst that will happen 
is the court will return the documents. 
In addition, the court is forced to explain what is necessary for 
the indictment to be satisfactory to the court.177 It is not the 
explanation itself that is problematic, but the return of the document 
with the explanation that creates situations where the judge ends up 
explaining to the procurator what he believes must be done in order 
to convict the accused. In doing so, the door is opened for potential 
violations of the presumption of innocence. Again, insufficient or 
flawed indictments should be grounds for dismissal of the case. 
Procurators should be the means of guaranteeing the safety of the 
populace, not the source of endless unresolved indictments against 
the accused. 
176 SeeKoNST. RF, supra note 52, art. 50(1). 
177 SeeUPKRF, supra note 25, art. 232. 
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Finally, the right of the Procuracy to appeal the factual aspects of 
a case or reopen a case on the basis of new evidence allows the 
accused to be essentially tried twice for the same crime. This arguably 
violates the accused's right to the determination of criminal charges 
against him. Within a system nominally committed to an adversarial 
judicial process, requiring the Procuracy to appeal even its own 
mistakes creates a schizophrenic understanding of the role of the 
procurator, one that leaves procurators uncertain as to their 
obligations. Placing the burden of appeal of procuratorial mistakes on 
the defense would help to allievate this confusion and would allow the 
procurator to serve in an adversarial role, as a prosecutor. 
The Russian Federation's past procuratorial behavior and proce-
dural legislation places it in violation of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights. The present 
Code of Criminal Procedure dates from 1960, the middle of the 
Khrushchev era. With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1993, 
and the ratification of the Convention in 1998, the Code is no longer 
responsive to the needs and obligations of the Russian Federation. All 
the existing legislation must be amended or redrafted to include the 
obligations imposed by the Convention's ratification. A new Code of 
Criminal Procedure is long overdue, and the laws governing the 
Procuracy and judiciary must also be amended and brought in line 
with the new Constitutional guarantees of an adversarial system and 
the presumption of innocence for the accused. 
